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Abstract. In this paper we present a key escrow system which meets
possible requirements for international key escrow, where dierent do-
mains may not trust each other. In this system multiple third parties,
who are trusted collectively but not individually, perform the dual role
of providing users with key management services and providing autho-
rised agencies in the relevant domains with warranted access to the users'
communications. We propose two escrowed key agreement mechanisms,
both designed for the case where the pair of communicating users are
in dierent domains, in which the pair of users and all the third parties
jointly generate a cryptographic key for end-to-end encryption. The fact
that all entities are involved in the key generation process helps make
it more dicult for deviant users to subvert the escrowed key by using
a hidden `shadow-key'. The rst mechanism makes use of a single set
of key escrow agencies moderately trusted by mutually mistrusting do-
mains. The second mechanism uses a transferable and veriable secret
sharing scheme to transfer key shares between two groups of key escrow
agencies, where one group is in each domain.
1 Introduction
1.1 Key escrow in mutually mistrusting domains
In modern secure telecommunications systems there are likely to be two contra-
dictory requirements. On the one hand users want to communicate securely with
other users, and on the other hand governments have requirements to intercept
user trac in order to combat crime and protect national security. A key escrow
system is designed to meet the needs of both users and governments, where a
cryptographic key for user communications is escrowed with a key escrow agency
(or a set of agencies) and later delivered to government agencies when lawfully
authorised. Following the US government's Clipper proposals, [1], a number of
key escrow systems have recently been proposed, and for an overview of the eld,
the reader is referred to [4].
When users communicate internationally, there is a potential requirement
to provide the law enforcement agencies of all the relevant countries, e.g. the
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originating and destination countries for the communication, with warranted
access to the user trac. For example, a global mobile telecommunications sys-
tem might provide an end-to-end condentiality service to two mobile users in
two dierent countries, and law enforcement agencies in both these countries
might independently wish to intercept these communications. To make matters
more complicated, these two countries will typically not trust one other (such
domains are referred to as mutually distrusting countries in [6]); for example, a
law enforcement agency in one country might not wish to let their counterpart
in any other country know that a particular user's communications are being
intercepted.
We are concerned here with international key escrow, and we assume through-
out that the countries involved do not trust one another; for the maximum gen-
erality we refer to domains instead of countries throughout. We also refer to
interception authorities where we mean bodies such as law enforcement agencies
who may be given the right to access communications within a single domain.
Finally we refer to escrow agencies or Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) who will
be responsible for maintaining all the information necessary to provide access to
interception agencies, when presented with the appropriate legal authorisation.
We now state our requirements for key escrow in an international (i.e. a
multi-domain) context.
1. No domain can individually control the generation of an escrowed key, and
hence the escrowed key cannot be chosen by entities in only one domain and
then transferred to the other domain.
2. The interception authorities in any domain can gain access to an escrowed
key without communicating with any other domain, i.e. the key has to be
capable of being escrowed in all relevant domains independently.
3. The entities in any domain can ensure the correctness and freshness of the
escrowed key.
1.2 Prior approaches
Jeeries, Mitchell and Walker [8] recently proposed a novel key escrow mecha-
nism suitable for international use, called the `JMW' mechanism for short. In
that scheme every user has an associated TTP. If two users, communicating
with each other securely by using end-to-end encryption, are located in dierent
domains, then the relevant pair of TTPs (one in each domain) collaboratively
perform the dual role of providing the users with key management services and
providing the two interception agencies with warranted access to the users' com-
munications. A session key for end-to-end encryption is established based on
Die-Hellman key exchange [5]. An asymmetric key agreement pair for one user
(the receiver) is separately computed by both TTPs (one in each domain) using
a combination of a secret key shared between them and the receiver's name,
and another asymmetric key agreement pair for the other user (the sender) is
generated by himself. The receiver computes the session key by combining his
private key (transferred securely from his own TTP) with the sender's public
key (sent with the encrypted message). The sender computes the same session
key by combining his private key with the receiver's public key (obtained from
the sender's own TTP). Interception agencies in each domain can retrieve the
session key from the TTP in the same domain.
Note that this mechanism meets the three requirements for key escrow listed
above. However, it requires the following assumptions about trust relationships
among the users, TTPs and interception agencies.
1. Each user believes that their own TTP (as well as the TTPs of any other
users with which they communicate) will issue proper key agreement values
and certicates, and will not reveal the escrowed key illegally.
2. Each TTP believes that the user, as a sender, will provide the correct public
key (matching the secret key he uses for securing messages he sends).
3. Each TTP believes that the other TTP will contribute proper key agreement
values and certicates, and will not reveal the escrowed key illegally.
4. Each interception agency believes that the TTP in its domain will provide
the correct escrowed key when requested.
In [6], Frankel and Yung give a dierent scheme for international key escrow,
which requires a key escrow agency (or agencies) to be trusted by more than one
domain.
1.3 Our contribution
In this paper we suppose that, in some environments where international key
escrow is required, TTPs may not be trusted individually to provide proper
contributions to an escrowed key and to reveal the key legally, and users also
may not be trusted to provide proper contributions to an escrowed key.
We consider two related key escrow mechanismswith the following properties.
1. The schemes use a set of moderately trusted third parties instead of a single
TTP, in an eort to prevent a single TTP from corrupting an escrowed key.
For the purposes of this paper, moderately trusted third parties are trusted
collectively, but not individually, by users, interception agencies and another
set of TTPs.
Key splitting schemes have previously been used for splitting an escrowed
key into n shares escrowed by n agencies in proposed key escrow systems
(e.g. see [4, 9, 11, 12]); we also make use of a k out of n threshold scheme.
Such a scheme allows any subset of k of the n escrow agencies to aect the
recovery of a complete key, but prohibits any group of fewer than k agencies
from recovering a complete key.
2. They use a veriable secret sharing scheme in order to prevent deviant users
from subverting the secret sharing scheme by providing improper shares. Such
a scheme has previously been adopted in a key escrow system to let a group
of key escrow agencies verify that they have valid shares [9].
3. They use an ane expansible veriable secret sharing scheme to let users
and third parties jointly generate an escrowed key, thus preventing deviant
users from obtaining a `shadow-key' (not available to the escrow agency).
4. The second scheme makes use of a transferable veriable secret sharing
scheme to transfer shares between two sets of key escrow agencies which
may not trust each other.
The remainder of the paper is subdivided as follows. In section 2, we present
a transferable veriable secret sharing scheme and an ane expansible veriable
secret sharing scheme based on the Shamir secret sharing scheme, [15], and the
Pedersen veriable secret sharing scheme, [13]. We then propose two mechanisms
for international key escrow in section 3. The rst, which incorporates Frankel
and Yung's idea, [6], makes use of a single group of key escrow agencies mod-
erately trusted by mutually mistrusting domains. The second scheme, which is
an alternative to the JMW mechanism, adopts the transferable and veriable
secret sharing scheme to transfer shares between two sets of moderately trusted
key escrow agencies, one set within each of two mutually mistrusting domains.
In both mechanisms, users and key escrow agencies jointly generate an escrowed
key by using the ane expansible veriable secret sharing scheme.
In section 4, we consider possible trust relationships among the three types
of entity involved in an international key escrow system, namely moderately
trusted third parties, potentially untrustworthy users and multiple mistrusting
domains. We conclude by giving two open questions.
2 Veriable Secret Sharing
In this section we rst briey describe the Shamir secret sharing scheme [15]
and the Pedersen veriable secret sharing scheme [13]. We then discuss how to
transfer a shared secret between two domains, and also how to share an ane
function of a shared secret, using modications of the Shamir and Pedersen
schemes. This work will provide the basis for the key escrow schemes described
subsequently.
2.1 The Shamir scheme
A (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a protocol in which a dealer dis-
tributes partial information (a share) about a secret to each of n participants
such that
 no group of fewer than k participants can obtain any information about the
secret, and
 any group of at least k participants can compute the secret.
We now describe the Shamir (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, [15].
Suppose p and q are large primes such that q divides p 1, and g is an element of
order q inZ
p
. It is assumed that p, q and g are publicly known. These parameters
will be used throughout this paper. Unless otherwise stated all arithmetic will
be computed modulo p.
Let the secret s be an element of Z
q
. In order to distribute s among P
1
, ...,
P
n
(where n < q) the dealer chooses a polynomial of degree k   1:
f(x) = a
0
+ a
1
x+ :::+ a
k 1
x
k 1
;
where f 2 Z
q
[x] and a
0
= s. Each participant P
i
(1  i  n) receives s
i
= f(x
i
)
as his private share, where x
i
2 Z
q
 f0g is public information about P
i
(x
i
6= x
j
,
for i 6= j).
Any k participants (without loss of generality we assume that they are P
1
,
P
2
, ..., P
k
) can nd f(x) by the interpolation formula,
f(x) =
k
X
i=1
(
Y
h6=i
x  x
h
x
i
  x
h
)f(x
i
) =
k
X
i=1
(
Y
h6=i
x  x
h
x
i
  x
h
)s
i
:
Thus
s = f(0) =
k
X
i=1
(
Y
h6=i
x
h
x
h
  x
i
)s
i
:
2.2 The Pedersen scheme
Assume that a dealer has a secret s 2 Z
q
and corresponding public value h = g
s
.
This secret can be distributed to and veried by P
1
, ..., P
n
, in the following way:
1. The dealer computes shares s
i
using the Shamir secret sharing scheme by rst
choosing a polynomial f(x) = a
0
+ a
1
x+ :::+ a
k 1
x
k 1
over Z
q
satisfying
a
0
= s and then computing s
i
= f(x
i
) (1  i  n). Here x
i
is public
information about P
i
as previously.
2. The dealer sends the share s
i
secretly to P
i
(1  i  n) and broadcasts a
verication sequence
V = (g
a
0
; g
a
1
; :::; g
a
k 1
)
to all n participants.
3. Each P
i
(1  i  n) computes
h
i
=
k 1
Y
j=0
(g
a
j
)
(x
i
)
j
;
and veries whether
h
i
= g
s
i
:
If this does not hold then P
i
broadcasts s
i
and stops. Otherwise P
i
accepts
the share.
4. Any k participants, who have accepted their shares, can nd s as described
in the Shamir secret sharing scheme above.
2.3 Transferable veriable secret sharing
We now consider how to transfer a shared secret between two groups of partic-
ipants. We start by stating our requirements for a (k;m; n)-transferable veri-
able secret sharing scheme, where k, m, and n are positive integers satisfying
1 < k  minfm;ng.
 A secret s shared by m participants P
1
, ..., P
m
needs to be transferred to,
and then shared by, another n participants Q
1
, ..., Q
n
.
 The participants Q
j
(1  j  n) must be able to verify their own private
shares without communicating with other participants in the same domain.
 Any group of at least k participants in Q
1
, ..., Q
n
, who have accepted their
shares, can compute s.
 No group of fewer than k participants in Q
1
, ..., Q
n
can obtain any infor-
mation about s.
We now present a transferable veriable secret sharing scheme based on the
Shamir and Pedersen schemes.
Algorithm 1 Assume that m participants P
i
(1  i  m) share a secret s 2 Z
q
using the Pedersen scheme. This secret can be transferred to and veried by
another n participants Q
j
(1  j  n), in the following way:
1. Each P
i
(1  i  m) computes new shares s
ij
(1  j  n) using the Shamir
secret sharing scheme by:
 rst choosing a polynomial f
i
(x) = a
i0
+a
i1
x+ :::+a
i(k 1)
x
k 1
over Z
q
satisfying a
i0
= s
i
, and
 then computing s
ij
= f
i
(x
j
). Here x
j
is public information about Q
j
.
2. P
i
(1  i  m) sends s
ij
secretly to Q
j
(1  j  n) and broadcasts a
verication sequence
V
i
= (g
a
i0
; :::; g
a
i(k 1)
)
to all n participants Q
1
, ..., Q
n
.
3. On receipt of s
ij
and V
i
(1  i  m), Q
j
(1  j  n) computes
h
ij
=
k 1
Y
l=0
(g
a
il
)
(x
j
)
l
;
and veries whether
h
ij
= g
s
ij
:
If this does not hold, Q
j
broadcasts s
ij
and stops. Otherwise Q
j
accepts the
share.
Theorem 2
1. Any group of at least k participants in Q
1
, ..., Q
n
, who have accepted their
shares following Algorithm 1, can nd s
i
(1  i  m), and hence compute
s.
2. No group of fewer than k participants in Q
1
, ..., Q
n
can obtain any infor-
mation about s
i
(1  i  m) and s.
3. Each Q
j
(1  j  n) can verify s
ij
(1  i  m) and g
s
without communi-
cating with other participants in the same domain.
Proof
All three parts of the theorem hold by using precisely the same arguments
as used to prove the same statements for the Pedersen scheme. 2
This scheme will be used to transfer a partial escrowed key from a set of
TTPs in one domain to another set of TTPs in a second domain inMechanism
7 described in the next section. The two groups of participants do not have to
trust each other. If fewer than k participants in any domain follow the scheme,
the secret transfer cannot be successful, but no one can subvert the algorithm
by forcing anyone else to accept a fraudulent secret.
2.4 Ane expansible veriable secret sharing
We now consider an ane expansion of threshold secret sharing. We start by
stating our requirements for `ane expansion'.
 A secret s 2 Z
q
is shared by m participants P
1
, ..., P
m
. Its ane function
w = as + b, where a; b 2 Z
q
and a 6= 0, needs to be shared by the same
participants. Here a and b are public information about P
i
(1  i  m).
 No group of fewer than k participants can obtain any information about w.
 Any group of at least k participants can compute w.
We now present an ane expansible veriable secret sharing scheme based
on the Shamir and Pedersen schemes.
Algorithm 3 Assume that m participants P
i
(1  i  m) share a secret s 2 Z
q
using the Pedersen scheme, and know public information a 2 Z
q
  f0g and
b 2 Z
q
. A new secret w = as+ b 2 Z
q
can be shared and veried by the same m
participants without communicating with one another. The new shares w
i
are
w
i
= as
i
+ b:
The corresponding public keys are
g
w
i
= g
as
i
+b
= (g
s
i
)
a
g
b
; and
g
w
= g
as+b
= (g
s
)
a
g
b
:
Theorem 4 The above algorithm has the following properties.
1. It meets the requirements for ane expansible secret sharing.
2. P
i
(1  i  m) can verify w
i
(1  i  m) and g
w
without communicating
with other participants.
Proof
This theorem again follows using precisely the same arguments as are used
to establish the properties of the Pedersen scheme. 2
This scheme will be used to let third parties provide an contribution to an
escrowed key in Mechanism 5 and Mechanism 7 described below. Because
the contribution is not known to users, it is dicult for the users to subvert the
escrowed key by using a hidden `shadow-public-key', the corresponding `shadow-
private-key' of which cannot be computed by using a real key pair and `shadow-
public-key' [9].
3 Escrowed key agreement
3.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for our model of an international key escrow
system.
 Two entities A and B, located in mutually mistrusting domains, want to
communicate securely with each other. For this purpose they need to verify
one another's identity and establish a shared session key K
AB
, although
before the authentication and key distribution processing starts they do not
share any secret.
 The communications between A and B have to meet potential legal require-
ments for warranted interception. Interception agencies in each domain are
not actively involved in the authentication and key distribution procedures,
but may require access to the session key K
AB
.
 In the rst scheme (Mechanism 5) a single set of TTPs fT
1
, ...,T
m
g are
used as both multiple authentication servers for the users, and key escrow
agencies for the interception agencies in both domains. In the second scheme
(Mechanism 7) two sets of TTPs fT
1
, ...,T
m
g and fU
1
, ..., U
n
g, one group
in each domain, are used as multiple authentication servers for the users
and key escrow agencies for the interception agencies. In both cases they are
responsible for verifying A's and B's identities, establishing a session key
K
AB
, and escrowing the session key. They are trusted by both the users and
interception agencies collectively, but not individually.
3.2 Mechanism 1
This escrowed key agreement scheme is based on Die-Hellman key exchange
[5] and the veriable secret sharing schemes described in section 2. In the mech-
anism, A and B are users in separate domains, and m moderately TTPs T
1
, ...,
Tm
work for both users as authentication servers, and for interception agencies
in both domains as key escrow agencies. We assume that A and B have authen-
ticated channels with T
i
(1  i  m). As in the JMW mechanism, these m
TTPs agree a commonly held secret key K(T
1
; :::; T
m
) and a function f . This
function f shall take as input the shared secret key and the names of A and B,
and generate a private integer S
TAB
. The scheme is designed so that for some
positive integer k (k  m), any set of k TTPs can compute the session key
established between A and B, but no group of k 1 or less TTPs can derive any
useful information about this session key.
Mechanism 5 A set of TTPs T
1
, ..., T
m
assist two users A and B in estab-
lishing a session key K
AB
, and escrow the key collectively.
1. A secretly chooses and stores its private key agreement value S
A
, and com-
putes the corresponding public value P
A
(= g
S
A
), the private shares S
A
i
(1  i  m) of S
A
as dened in subsection 2.1, and the public verication
sequence V
A
as dened in subsection 2.2, and then sends S
A
i
and V
A
to T
i
(1  i  m).
2. B follows the same procedure as A (choosing S
B
, creating private shares S
B
i
,
a verication sequence V
B
, and sending S
B
i
and V
B
to T
i
(1  i  m)).
3. T
i
(1  i  m) veries S
A
i
, P
A
, and S
B
i
, P
B
as described in subsection
2.2. If the verication fails, T
i
broadcasts the suspect share value and stops;
otherwise T
i
accepts the share.
4. T
i
(1  i  m) does the following:
 obtains S
TAB
by using the function f with K(T
1
; :::; T
m
), A and B,
 calculates P
AT
(= P
S
TAB
A
) and P
BT
(= P
S
TAB
B
), and
 sends P
AT
to B and P
BT
to A.
5. A and B separately compute a session key as:
K
AB
= (P
AT
)
S
B
= (P
BT
)
S
A
= g
S
A
S
B
S
TAB
:
Theorem 6 The above mechanism has the property that any group of at least
k TTPs can compute K
AB
(which is what is required for escrow purposes).
Proof
Any group of at least k TTPs can compute S
A
and S
B
(by the properties of
the Shamir scheme discussed in subsection 2.1 above). Hence they can compute
K
AB
= g
S
A
S
B
S
TAB
and the result follows. 2
The mechanism has been designed to make it dicult for A and B to prevent
K
AB
from being escrowed by using a hidden `shadow-key'. In addition, no third
party can force A or B to accept a wrong message unless all the third parties are
colluding, and no group of fewer than k third parties can obtain any information
about K
AB
.
The method used to compose a set of key escrow agencies, who are moder-
ately trusted by mutually mistrusting domains, depends on the requirements for
international secure telecommunications. The set could consist of TTPs licensed
by domains other than the two domains being served, or by a `super-domain'
including the two domains, or one or other of the two domains.
It would be desirable if S
TAB
could be changed from time to time (which will
mean that K
AB
also changes). This could be achieved by including a date-stamp
in the function f used to compute S
TAB
.
Compared with a number of other proposed key agreement schemes, such as,
letting the two users choose the key (see [7]), letting a set of TTPs generate the
key (see [3]), and letting one user and two TTPs generate the key (see [8]), this
mechanism forces all involved entities, i.e. both users and the set of TTPs, to
jointly generate the key, so that it may be more dicult for users and TTPs to
subvert the key.
3.3 Mechanism 2
This escrowed key agreement scheme is based on Die-Hellman key exchange
[5] and the transferable veriable secret sharing scheme described in section
2. In this mechanism, A and B are users in dierent domains. There are m
TTPs T
1
, ..., T
m
working for A as authentication servers (in A's domain), and n
TTPs U
1
, ..., U
n
working for B as authentication servers (in B's domain). These
servers also operate as key escrow agencies for the interception agencies in their
respective domains. Each set of third parties is moderately trusted by their users
and interception agencies. Users and interception agencies do not communicate
with TTPs outside their domain. TTP T
i
(1  i  m) can communicate with
U
j
(1  j  n). Again, we assume that A has an authenticated channel with
each T
i
, and B has an authenticated channel with each U
j
. Each group of TTPs
agree a secret key K(T
1
; :::; T
m
) or K(U
1
; :::; U
n
) and a function f . This function
f shall take as input the shared secret keys and the names of A and B, and
generate private integers S
TAB
and S
UAB
respectively. The scheme is designed
so that for some positive integer k (k  minfm;ng), any set of k TTPs from one
or other of the two domains can compute the session key established between A
and B, but no group of k   1 or less TTPs can derive any useful information
about this session key.
Mechanism 7 Two sets of TTPs fT
1
, ...,T
m
g and fU
1
, ...,U
n
g assist two users
A and B (respectively) to establish a session key K
AB
. Each set of third parties
escrow the key collectively.
1. A secretly chooses and stores its private key agreement value S
A
, and com-
putes the following values:
 the corresponding public value P
A
(= g
S
A
),
 the private shares S
A
i
(1  i  m) as dened in subsection 2.1, and
 the public verication sequence V
A
as dened in subsection 2.2, and then
sends S
A
i
and V
A
to T
i
(1  i  m).
2. T
i
(1  i  m) veries S
A
i
and P
A
as described in subsection 2.2. If the ver-
ication fails then T
i
broadcasts the suspect share value and stops; otherwise
T
i
accepts the share.
3. B secretly chooses and stores its private key agreement value S
B
, and com-
putes the following values:
 the corresponding public value P
B
(= g
S
B
),
 the private shares S
B
j
(1  j  n) as dened in subsection 2.1, and
 the public verication sequence V
B
as dened in subsection 2.2, and then
sends S
B
j
and V
B
to U
j
(1  j  n).
4. U
j
(1  j  n) veries S
B
j
and P
B
as described in subsection 2.2. If the ver-
ication fails then U
j
broadcasts the suspect share value and stops; otherwise
U
j
accepts the share.
5. T
i
(1  i  m) does the following:
 obtains S
TAB
by using the function f with K(T
1
; :::; T
m
), A and B,
 calculates P
AT
(= P
S
TAB
A
),
 calculates S
A
ij
(1  j  n) from S
A
i
as dened in subsection 2.3,
 computes the `private shares' S
A
ij
S
TAB
, and their corresponding public
values g
S
A
ij
S
TAB
as dened in subsection 2.4, and the public verication
sequence V
A
i
as dened in subsection 2.2.
 Finally, T
i
sends S
A
ij
S
TAB
, V
A
i
and P
AT
to U
j
(1  j  n).
6. U
j
(1  j  n) veries S
A
ij
S
TAB
, V
A
i
and P
AT
as described in subsection
2.3. If the verication fails then U
j
broadcasts the suspect share value and
stops, otherwise U
j
accepts the share.
7. U
j
(1  j  n) does the following:
 obtains S
UAB
by using the function f with K(U
1
; :::; U
n
), A and B,
 calculates P
ATU
(= P
S
UAB
AT
) and sends it to B,
 calculates P
BU
(= P
S
UAB
B
),
 calculates S
B
ji
(1  i  m) from S
B
j
as dened in subsection 2.3,
 computes the `private shares' S
B
ji
S
UAB
, and their corresponding public
values g
S
B
ji
S
UAB
as dened in subsection 2.4, and the public verication
sequence V
B
j
as dened in subsection 2.2, and, nally,
 sends S
B
ji
S
UAB
, V
B
j
and P
BU
to T
i
(1  i  m).
8. T
i
(1  i  m) veries S
B
ji
S
UAB
, V
B
j
and P
BU
as described in subsection
2.3. If the verication fails then T
i
broadcasts the suspect share value and
stops, otherwise T
i
accepts the share, calculates P
BTU
(= P
S
TAB
BU
) and sends
it to A.
9. A and B can now separately compute the session key:
K
AB
= (P
BTU
)
S
A
= (P
ATU
)
S
B
= g
S
A
S
B
S
TAB
S
UAB
:
Theorem 8 The above mechanism has the property that any group of at least
k TTPs (in either domain) can compute K
AB
.
Proof
The proof follows immediately from the results in subsection 3.2 above. 2
In this mechanism, the two sets of third parties in both domains do not have
to trust each other, as mentioned in subsection 2.3. For the same reasons as in
the previous mechanism, it is suggested that S
TAB
and S
UAB
should be changed
as often as required.
4 Further considerations
In a key escrow system, the diering requirements of users and interception au-
thorities are further complicated by the introduction of the key escrow agencies
(or TTPs). The key escrow agencies are responsible to the interception agen-
cies for preventing criminal users from abusing escrowed keys. Both the users
and interception agencies should be in a position to check that the key escrow
agencies cannot reveal escrowed keys illegally. In international key escrow, the
relationships amongst these three groups of entities becomes still more compli-
cated because more than one domain is involved. The key escrow agencies in one
domain have a potential requirement to check that the key escrow agencies in
the other domain cannot subvert the escrowed keys.
In this section, we discussion some aspects of the trust relationships between
the various entities involved.
4.1 Moderately trusted third parties
There are two major reasons why we make use of moderately trusted third parties
in this paper.
 If interception agencies are not actively involved in session key establishment
for possibly deviant users and do not store every session key themselves, key
escrow agencies are required to provide a valid key when lawfully authorised.
Although the key escrow agencies may not be trusted individually, a group
of them might be collectively trusted by the interception agencies.
 If two users sharing no secret want to communicate security with each other,
they need an authentication service provided by authentication servers. Al-
though the servers may not be trusted individually, a group of them might
be collectively trusted by their users.
Four kinds of key splitting schemes based on secret sharing schemes (e.g.
[2, 15]) have been used for splitting an escrowed key into n shares escrowed by n
agencies in previously proposed key escrow systems. The rst approach involves
`splitting' with an n out of n scheme, where all n components are needed to
restore a given key [12]. The second approach uses splitting with an k out of n
threshold scheme, which allows any subset of k of the n escrow agencies to aect
the recovery of a complete key, but prohibits any group of fewer than k agencies
from recovering a complete key [9]. The third approach involves splitting with an
(n; t; u)-escrow scheme, which allows a subset of the escrow agencies to recover
a key, where t escrow agencies could conspire without compromising a key, and
n   u agencies could `withhold' their components without interfering with key
recovery (t < u  n) [11]. The last approach involves splitting with a `general
monotone access structure', which allows for the specication of arbitrary subsets
of escrow agencies that can work together to restore a key [4].
We have used the second approach in the mechanisms described here. Ac-
tually, any one of these four splitting schemes could have been chosen, and in
practice the choice would depend on the requirements for establishing a set of
moderately trusted third parties. Note also that the idea of Reiter et al. regard-
ing secure group implementation in [14] can be used to establish such a set of
moderately trusted third parties and their group key.
4.2 Untrustworthy users
We now consider the case where users are not trustworthy in a key escrow system.
Kilian and Leighton gave a `shadow-public-key' attack in [9], and we now see
how this attack might work in a key escrow system based on Die-Hellman key
exchange. Each normal user generates a pair (P , S), publishes P and gives an
interception authority the ability to reconstruct S, so that both the users and
interception authority can compute an escrowed key by using Die-Hellman key
agreement. In this attack, each of two attackers instead generates two key pairs
(P , S) and (P
0
, S
0
), where (P , S) is a proper (public- key, private-key) pair, (P
0
,
S
0
) is a `shadow' key pair, and P
0
= f(P ) where f is an easily computed and
publicly known function. Each of them uses (P , S) in the same way as would an
ordinary user, but keeps S
0
reserved as his shadow private key. Both attackers
separately compute a `shadow-escrowed-key' by using his `shadow-private-key'
and the other's `shadow-public-key'. If it is infeasible to obtain S
0
by knowing P ,
P
0
and S, the interception authority cannot obtain the `shadow-escrowed-key'.
Furthermore the interception authority may not detect this cheating.
We presented an ane expansible veriable secret sharing scheme in subsec-
tion 2.4, which provided the basis of users and third parties jointly generating
an escrowed key in order to prevent the users from using a hidden `shadow-key'.
Note that it only makes sense to prevent criminal users from obtaining a S
0
which is in feasibly computed by using P , P
0
and S.
The further problem is how in practice to prevent criminal users from abus-
ing the key escrow system by using improper keys, for examples, using an old
escrowed key instead of a current one, using a modication of the escrowed key,
e.g. which may be a publicly known function of the real escrowed key, and using
a `shadow-public-key', where S
0
may feasibly be computed by knowing P , P
0
and S. Although these abuses are all detectable, a key escrow mechanism may
never check for such abuses, giving deviant users greater leeway in their abuses.
A number of approaches could be used to prevent the above abuses, such
as, keeping all old escrowed keys in a valid period to check if they are used
again, and monitoring all communication channels between suspected criminal
users [10]. Unfortunately, these approaches may not be practical, particularly, in
complicated mobile telecommunications systems.
In fact, it is impossible for a key escrow system to force two users to use only
the current escrow key if the users share a secret or can use their own security
system. For the purposes of this paper, we suppose that two users, who want to
communicate securely with each other, have to get assistance from key escrow
agencies in order to authenticate one another's identity and establish a shared
session key. We assume it is detectable if the users subvert key escrow systems
by using an old escrowed key or a modied escrowed key. However we have not
answered the question of how to force users to use only the current escrowed
key.
4.3 Multiple mistrusting domains
So far we have discussed key escrow in mutually mistrusting domains. However,
some modern secure communications may cover more than two domains. For
example, in a global mobile telecommunications system, two users, respectively,
are citizens of countries C and D, work for countries E and F , are registered
with two mobile companies belong to countries G and H, and are roaming in
two countries I and J . Their trac might conceivably need to be intercepted
by agencies in any of countries C   J , and hence it may be necessary to try
and devise an international key escrow system which provides all governments
involved with warranted access to user communications. To make matters more
complicated, the countries involved may not all trust each other.
Our rst mechanism, as described in subsection 3.2, could be used for this
purpose. However, whether or not a set of key escrow agencies could be set
up which are moderately trusted by multiple mistrusting domains, depends on
political considerations beyond the scope of this paper. The second mechanism,
as described in subsection 3.3, could also be used for this purpose, at least in
theory. The problem is that each set of key escrow agencies in each domain
involved have to collaborate to provide contributions to the escrowed key. This
may not be practical, particularly when the number of domains involved is quite
large.
5 Conclusions
We have described a key escrow system using moderately trusted third parties
in mutually mistrusting domains and analysed its use.
The following open questions are of potential practical importance.
 Do there exist practical key escrow systems forcing users to use only the
current escrowed session key?
 Can a practical key escrow scheme be designed for the case where more than
two domains are involved, and where escrow agencies are not permitted to
span more than one domain?
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